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This paper analyzes the impact of particular loss offset limitations on intrastate and cross-
border investment decisions. Investment can be realized in the investor’s domestic business, 
in a foreign branch or in a foreign subsidiary. The relative impact on the optimal real 
investment alternative compared to the optimal financial investment alternative indicates the 
investment incentives of tax law asymmetries. Integrating an initial loss carryforward at the 
time of investment creates a special decision situation. Varying loss offset parameters 
typically induces ambiguous effects that depend on the combination of all parameters under 
consideration. On average, a domestic minimum tax and a time limit on loss carryforwards 
tend to depress real investment. However, it is possible to find counter-examples. Real 
investment projects with decreasing cash flows and expected infra-marginal projects are less 
likely to be discriminated against than projects with increasing cash flows and expected 
marginal projects, respectively. An initial loss carryforward generates a domestic lock-in 
effect that may be intensified by loss offset limitations. Depending on the parameter setting, 
the opposite – a push-out effect – may occur as well. 
Keywords: investment, asymmetric taxation, loss offset, loss carryforward, minimum tax. 
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Tax planning of cross-border investment is a quite demanding task. Investors have to take
the multitude of national tax systems as well as their interdependencies into account.
Compared to intrastate investment decisions, the number of variables and restrictions
rises dramatically. This is obvious even when deciding upon whether or not to carry out a
single real investment project. Assuming a given legal structure, it is suﬃcient to evaluate
the objective variables, e.g. post-tax net present values (NPVs) or future values (FVs)
for deciding on domestic investment. Adding the possibility of cross-border investment,
it becomes necessary to optimize the legal structure of foreign activities because this
determines whether a double taxation occurs and which method can be applied to avoid
double taxation. In the following step, the value of the objective function for realizing
the project can be compared to the value of the objective function for the alternative
ﬁnancial investment that might be realized instead. Optimization of the legal structure
of foreign activities is necessary not only for the project under consideration, but also for
ﬁnancial investment, because appraisal of a particular investment project must refer to
the optimal alternative, not an arbitrary one. Thus, cross-border investment involves at
least a two-stage optimization process.
Tax loss oﬀset rules are crucial parameters for both intrastate or cross-border tax planning.
Asymmetric taxation, i.e. deviations from the neutral case of immediate and full loss oﬀset
are applied in nearly any country. Internationally, there is a wide variety of diﬀerent loss
oﬀset limitations which cause additional tax planning and tax compliance costs.
Asymmetric taxation typically reduces an investor’s wealth, whereas the investment in-
centives are ambiguous, at least for domestic investment1. In contrast, it is not yet clear
which investment eﬀects are caused by a minimum tax or other types of loss oﬀset limi-
tations in an international context. A thorough analysis has to take tax eﬀects on each
investment alternative into account, this means real as well as ﬁnancial investment. This
is especially true for cross-border decisions where tax loss oﬀset rules determine the legal
structure of diﬀerent alternatives. The objective of this paper is to quantify the resulting
investment incentives.
Variations of the loss oﬀset parameters will be analyzed with regard to the following
questions:
• Which is the optimal legal structure for real and ﬁnancial investment?
• Is domestic or foreign investment taxed preferentially?
• Is real or ﬁnancial investment taxed preferentially?
1Cf. Niemann (2003).
1• Which legal structure of foreign investment is taxed preferentially?
The question of a possible tax loss oﬀset paradox deserves special attention. This means
that either real investment compared to ﬁnancial investment or domestic investment com-
pared to foreign investment is encouraged due to restricting domestic loss oﬀset rules. The
basis for this analysis is an individual investment model that yields not only individual
implications, but also recommendations for tax policy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: After an overview of the literature on
international tax planning and asymmetric taxation in section 2, the investment model’s
assumptions are presented in section 3. Section 4 points out the possible investment
incentives resulting from loss oﬀset restrictions using deterministic examples. In section
5, the dominating eﬀects are derived by means of Monte Carlo simulations. Section 6
summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature
The extensive literature on international tax planning2 often addresses subjects like the
optimal legal structure of foreign activities3, optimal repatriation and ﬁnancing strate-
gies4, and anti tax-avoidance provisions5. Investment eﬀects of loss oﬀset restrictions in
an international context are rarely discussed6.
In the German-language literature on asymmetric taxation, the tax law perspective pre-
vails7 whereas the investment incentives are often disregarded. The international litera-
ture8, in contrast, emphasizes the eﬀects of asymmetric taxation on investment behavior.
This is also true for the literature that critisizes the U.S. alternative minimum tax9 since
it was implemented in 198710.
Due to the non-linearity and the path-dependence of loss oﬀset rules, numerical techniques
2Cf. Alworth (1988), e.g.
3Cf. Gordon/Jun (1993).
4Cf. Hartman (1985), Alworth (1988), Altshuler/Newlon (1993), Leechor/Mintz (1993), Sinn (1993),
Grubert (1998), Wunder (1999), Babcock (2000), Altshuler/Grubert (2002), Kari/Yl¨ a-Liedenpohja
(2003).
5Cf. Weichenrieder (1996).
6Cf. G´ erard/Weiner (2003) for loss-oﬀset and formula apportionment and Lyon/Silverstein (1995) for
the eﬀects of the U.S. alternative minimum tax on multi-national corporations.
7Cf. Raupach/B¨ ockstiegel (1999), Altfelder (2000), e.g.
8Cf. Domar/Musgrave (1944), Barlev/Levy (1975), Eeckhoudt/Hansen (1982), Auerbach (1986),
Auerbach/Poterba (1987), MacKie-Mason (1990), Eeckhoudt/Gollier/Schlesinger (1997). For the empir-
ical relevance cf. Mintz (1988) using eﬀective tax rates and Altshuler/Auerbach (1990). The similarities
between call options and taxes are discussed by Ball/Bowers (1982), Majd/Myers (1985), Majd/Myers
(1987), Schnabel/Roumi (1990), Lund (1992), Lund (2000).
9The U.S. alternative minimum tax is not equivalent to the minimum tax discussed below, because it
requires the calculation of a separate tax base and can be described as a parallel tax system.
10Cf. Bernheim (1989), Lyon (1990), Lyon (1997), Feenberg/Poterba (2003), Burman/Gale/Rohaly
(2003), Burman/Gale/Rohaly (2002).
2are used to appraise investment projects with losses11. Some papers on asymmetric tax-
ation ignore the tax impact on ﬁnancial investment12 which may be a decisive factor for
investment incentives.
While loss oﬀset restrictions are natural links to quantitative international tax planning,
both areas of tax literature are widely unrelated. Moreover, investment decisions under
existing loss carryforwards have not been analyzed at all. For this reason, it is not yet
clear whether the impact of asymmetric taxation on investment behavior is intensiﬁed or
reduced in an international setting. It is the aim of this paper to correct this shortcoming
by modeling both real and ﬁnancial investment taking international taxation into account.
We will analyze the impact of diﬀerent domestic and foreign loss oﬀset limitations on the
relative advantage of real versus ﬁnancial investment.
3 Model design
3.1 Assumptions
At time t = 0, an investor with a ﬁnite time horizon of T periods decides on the use
of equity capital in the amount of A0. It can be invested either in a real investment
project with cash ﬂows CFt (t = 1,...,T) or a ﬁnancial investment with a constant pre-
tax interest rate i. Borrowing is possible at the same interest rate i. Returning cash
ﬂows from real or ﬁnancial investment are re-invested until the time horizon T. The real
investment project as well as ﬁnancial investment can be realized either in the investor’s
domestic business or in the foreign country. Pre-tax cash ﬂows and the pre-tax interest
rate are identical in the home country and in the foreign country.
In the following, we will consider a case that is related to German tax law. The investor
operates either an individual enterprise or a partnership. This means that the domestic
legal structure is ﬁxed. In contrast, the legal structure of the foreign activities is still
disposable. The legal structure determines whether double taxation occurs and which
method can be applied to avoid it. To restrict complexity, only the foreign branch and
the foreign subsidiary will be analyzed. It is assumed that a double taxation agreement
exempts proﬁts of a foreign branch13. This implies that branch proﬁts are subject only
to foreign taxation. There is no additional domestic tax on repatriations.
At ﬁrst sight, the proﬁts of a foreign subsidiary are subject only to foreign taxation, too.
Under a classical corporation tax like in Germany and many other countries, shareholders
are taxed upon repatriations. Therefore, dividends, capital gains and proﬁts from liq-
uidating a – domestic or foreign – corporation are subject to domestic personal income
tax. As a consequence, the relative advantage or disadvantage of investment in a foreign
subsidiary versus investment in a foreign branch or versus domestic investment is also
determined by domestic taxation and with it by domestic loss oﬀset rules.
11Cf. Haegert/Kramm (1977) who analyze the eﬀects of a loss carryback on investment behavior. Cf.
Majd/Myers (1985), Majd/Myers (1987).
12Cf. De Waegenaere/Sansing/Wielhouver (2001), partly Schnabel/Roumi (1990).
13Cf. Art. 7 (1) 1, 2. HS in combination with Art. 23 A (1) OECD double taxation convention.
3A pivotal determinant for the choice of location is the nominal tax rate. Since Germany is
often regarded as a high-tax country14, we will assume that the domestic personal income
tax rate is proportional, equals τD = 40% and exceeds the foreign personal income tax
rate of τB = 30% and the foreign corporate tax rate of τS = 20%15.
We will assume terminal repatriation, which means that all cash ﬂows (from real and ﬁ-
nancial investment) are re-invested in the initially chosen investment alternative. Only at
the time horizon T, the investor receives a return of capital. Choice of the legal structure
in t = 0 is assumed irreversible. As a consequence, dividends of the foreign subsidiary
are excluded for the entire time horizon. Of course, this assumption is quite restrictive,
but it is necessary for reasons of transparency. Intertemporal optimization of repatria-
tion policy is a very complex task16 that typically involves mixed-integer optimization
problems. Integrating repatriation policy, it would become impossible to separate the
investment incentives induced by loss oﬀset rules, repatriation decisions, and choice of the
legal structure. For domestic investment, withdrawals are excluded, too.
To isolate the eﬀects of asymmetric taxation, we will assume that the tax base is calculated
identically in both countries. Analogous to the standard model of capital budgeting with
taxes17 the tax base is the diﬀerence between cash ﬂows and depreciation deductions. For
reasons of simplicity, we consider only linear depreciation allowances that are identical
at home and abroad. Other non-cash accruals do not exist. In accordance with current
law in Germany, interest income is fully taxable; there are no special tax rates. Positive
and negative interest payments belong to the same income basket as proﬁts from real
investment. For lack of other income sources, there is only an internal oﬀsetting of losses
from real investment with possibly positive interest income.
If domestic investment is carried out the sum of earnings in the home country – as a ﬁrst
step towards computing the tax base – is calculated as:
SoE
D
t = CFt − δt + Int
I
t (1)
with CFt: cash ﬂow
δt: depreciation allowances
Intt R 0: interest income
SoEt: sum of earnings
t: time index
If investment is carried out in the foreign branch the sum of earnings in the foreign country
can be computed analogously. In this case, the sum of earnings in the home country is
14Cf. EU commission (2001), pp. 91 ﬀ., e.g.
15Superscripts D indicate domestic variables, B variables related to the foreign branch, S variables in
connection with the foreign subsidiary.
16Cf. Altshuler/Newlon (1993), Grubert (1998), Wunder (1999), Altshuler/Grubert (2002). In this
paper, we do not optimize ﬁnancial policy of the ﬁrm, because the interdependencies are too complex to
separate them from the eﬀects of loss oﬀset rules.









t = 0 (3)
Asterisks indicate foreign tax parameters. Calculating the sum of earnings for the foreign
subsidiary, the investor has to take into account that half of the capital gain18 from























T: terminal value of the foreign subsidiary
The latest available German income tax statistic from 1998 shows current loss carryfor-
wards of about 300 billion EUR. Loss-oﬀset limitations imposed by the tax legislation
often intend to restrict the use of loss carryforwards. For this reason, it is sensible to
integrate an exogenously-given initial loss carryforward at time t = 0 that is derived
from the investor’s past activities. The initial loss carryforward may be zero or positive:
L0 ≥ 0. This assumption creates a novel decision situation that has been neglected by
the literature.
To restrict the number of loss oﬀset parameters, loss carrybacks are excluded19, and only
loss carryforwards are permitted. Two limitations, a minimum tax and a time limit,
restrict the use of loss carryforwards, both of which are currently practiced in several EU
countries.
A minimum tax means that a fraction α of positive proﬁts is subject to tax, regardless of
existing loss carryforwards. Existing loss carryforwards can only be oﬀset over a longer
period of time. A minimum tax is levied in Austria20 since 2001 and in Germany21 since
2004. The tax base of period t is deﬁned as the maximum of the sum of earnings less
loss carryforward at the beginning of the period and the fraction of proﬁts that is at least
taxable. If the sum of earnings is negative, the tax base is zero22.
yt = max{0;SoEt − Lt−1;α · SoEt} (7)
18This provision – the so-called half-income system – is a shareholder relief element in the classical
corporation tax in Germany.
19Haegert/Kramm found as early as 1977 that the impact of loss carrybacks is negligible.
20Cf. § 2 (2b) ¨ oEStG (Austrian income tax code).
21Cf. § 10d (2) EStG (German income tax code).
22A possible deduction from the minimum tax will be disregarded. According to § 10d (2) EStG the
deduction amounts to 1 million EUR. This means that the minimum tax can be neglected by taxpayers
with a sum of earnings of less than 1 million EUR.
5with Lt: loss carryforward at end of period t
yt: taxable income
α: minimum tax fraction
A time limit on loss carryforwards can be found in several EU countries and in some tax
reform proposals. It means that a loss that occurs in period t can only be oﬀset with
proﬁts of periods t + 1,...,t + Tf. The remaining sum is discarded. Consequently, the
initial loss carryforward L0 can be oﬀset only in periods t = 1,...,Tf.
A loss carryforward at the time horizon t = T cannot be oﬀset any more. The investor
terminates his economic activities at this point of time. Selling the loss carryforward to
other taxpayers is excluded. Thus, the remaining loss carryforward is attached zero value.
3.2 Measuring tax eﬀects
The criterion for the investment decision is the diﬀerence of the future values (FVs) of
real and ﬁnancial investment. Basically, it would also be possible to compute net present
values instead, but this criterion would require FVs, too. The reason is that a limited loss
oﬀset always requires an explicit linkage of subsequent periods and with it a complete cash
ﬂow statement for both real and ﬁnancial investment. An interest rate that mirrors the
post-tax rate of return of ﬁnancial investment correctly that is necessary for computing
net present values can be derived only endogenously on the basis of FVs23. Therefore,
FVs can be directly compared.
Cross-border investment alternatives imply a multitude of possible decision alternatives.
Real as well as ﬁnancial investment can be realized in the investor’s domestic business, in
the foreign branch, or in the foreign subsidiary. As a consequence, the optimal ﬁnancial
investment is not obvious. Rather, it emerges as a result of an optimization process and















F : future value of ﬁnancial investment in the foreign branch
FV D
F : future value of ﬁnancial investment in the domestic business
FV S
F : future value of ﬁnancial investment in the foreign subsidiary
FV max
F : maximum future value of ﬁnancial investment














23The necessity for an endogenous interest rate is emphasized by Cooper/Franks (1983), Shevlin (1990).
24Financial investment is denoted with subscript F, real investment with subscript R.
6with FV B
R : future value of real investment in the foreign branch
FV D
R : future value of real investment in the domestic business
FV S
R: future value of real investment in the foreign subsidiary
FV max
R : maximum future value of real investment






with ∆FV : diﬀerence of optimal future values
of real and ﬁnancial investment
The reference case for measuring the eﬀects of particular loss oﬀset parameters is the full
and immediate loss oﬀset25. Using this reference case, deviations from neutral loss oﬀset
can be identiﬁed. The measure for the impact of loss oﬀset rules on investment behavior
is the diﬀerence ∆ between the diﬀerences of future values of real and ﬁnancial investment












diﬀerence of future values
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F : maximum future value of ﬁnancial investment under FLO
FV
max,LLO
F : maximum future value of ﬁnancial investment under LLO
FV
max,FLO
R : maximum future value of real investment under FLO
FV
max,LLO
R : maximum future value of real investment under LLO
∆: diﬀerence of diﬀerences of future values
∆FV FLO: diﬀerence of future values under FLO
∆FV LLO: diﬀerence of future values under LLO
∆ reveals the deviation of the decision criterion from neutral loss oﬀset. A positive
(negative) value indicates that real investment is taxed discriminatory (preferentially)
compared to neutral taxation. A loss oﬀset paradox is characterized by negative values
for ∆. The sign and value of ∆ are determined by loss oﬀset parameters as well as the
cash ﬂow structure and rate of return of the underlying real investment.
4 Deterministic cash ﬂows
In the following section, the possible investment incentives of loss oﬀset limitations are
described by means of deterministic examples with diﬀerent cash ﬂow structures.
25Cf. Schneider (1992), e.g.
26Values on the basis of full, immediate loss oﬀset are denoted with superscript FLO, values on the
basis on incomplete or limited loss oﬀset with superscript LLO.
74.1 Declining cash ﬂows
We look at an investment project with cash ﬂows mainly at the beginning of the economic
life that decline over time. This eﬀect can be observed when a mature product is imitated
by competitors. In the following example, the real investment project 1 with an initial
outlay of A0 = 1 million EUR and the following cash ﬂow will be examined:
Table 1: cash ﬂow of project 1 (in ,000 EUR)
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CFt 400 300 200 125 100 50 50 50 50 50
This project yields a positive pre-tax NPV of 26,991 EUR (diﬀerence of pre-tax FVs:
+ 70,008 EUR). Since the present value of linear depreciation allowances falls short of
the present value of economic depreciation, the diﬀerence of post-tax FVs under full loss
oﬀset is negative as can be seen from the following table:
Tabelle 2: future values of project 1 (in EUR)













∆FV D 70,008 – 35,017
∆FV 70,008 – 21,492
The optimal ways of realizing real and ﬁnancial investment are printed in bold face. In
addition to the diﬀerence of optimal FVs ∆FV the diﬀerence of domestic FVs ∆FV D
is given, too. In our example, the foreign branch would be the optimal way to realize
real as well as ﬁnancial investment. Without an initial loss carryforward L0, the choice of
location could be based on nominal tax rates in this case, which would be rather trivial.
In contrast, for initial loss carryforwards of L0 = 100,000 or L0 = 650,000, the FVs are
given by:
8Table 3: FVs of project 1 with initial loss carryforward (in EUR)
L0 = 100,000 L0 = 650,000
future value FLO α = 0, Tf = T FLO α = 0, Tf = T
FV D
F 1,862,482 1,858,427 2,256,468 2,175,168
FV B
F 2,045,837 1,967,151 2,478,611 1,967,151
FV S
F 2,004,226 1,967,140 2,428,196 2,158,925
FV D
R 1,827,464 1,823,409 2,221,451 2,177,737
FV B
R 2,024,345 1,945,659 2,457,118 1,945,659
FV S
R 2,004,082 1,966,996 2,428,053 2,158,746
∆FV D – 35,017 – 35,017 – 35,017 + 2,569
∆FV – 21,492 – 155 – 21,492 + 2,569
∆ – 21,338 – 24,062
A domestic initial loss carryforward L0 > 0 implies that domestic alternatives remain
(partially) tax-free. Consequently, domestic investment alternatives gain an advantage
over foreign investment alternatives. Moreover, the foreign subsidiary is taxed preferen-
tially compared to the foreign branch, because half of the capital gain from liquidating
the foreign corporation would be subject to domestic taxation without initial loss carry-
forward (L0 = 0) and remains (partially) tax-free with initial loss carryforward (L0 > 0).
The foreign branch is unaﬀected by domestic tax parameters. For suﬃciently small val-
ues of L0, the foreign branch is the optimal alternative, for medium-sized values, it is the
foreign subsidiary. If L0 is suﬃciently high, domestic investment will be optimal. For
L0 > 617,835 EUR, domestic ﬁnancial investment is the optimal ﬁnancial investment,
for L0 > 618,424 EUR, domestic real investment is the optimal way of realizing real
investment. Since these thresholds are not identical, the optimal legal structure of real
and ﬁnancial investment may diﬀer. This is one reason for the non-monotonicity of the
diﬀerence of FVs with respect to L0.
From the negative values for ∆ it can be seen that the unlimited loss carryforward favors
real over ﬁnancial investment in this setting if an initial loss carryforward exists. Since
restricting the loss oﬀset rules favors real investment this situation can be described as a
loss oﬀset paradox.
The trade-oﬀ between a high domestic nominal tax rate and the possibility to oﬀset loss
carryforwards in contrast to low foreign nominal tax rates and limited possibilities to oﬀset
loss carryforwards implies a domestic lock-in eﬀect. Whether domestic loss oﬀset rules
favor real or ﬁnancial investment remains to be analyzed and depends on the structure of
cash ﬂows and the rate of return.
Introducing a minimum tax may intensify the trade-oﬀ and with it the lock-in eﬀect. The
critical thresholds of L0 above which domestic investment is optimal decline after the
introduction of a minimum tax:
9Table 4: indiﬀerence values of L0 for project 1
indiﬀerence value L˜
0 α = 0;Tf = T α = 0.25;Tf = T α = 0.4;Tf = T α = 0;Tf = 5
ﬁnancial investment 617,835 531,930 488,832 274,170
real investment 618,425 535,466 493,720 280,898
The more restrictive the minimum tax, the more pronounced the domestic lock-in eﬀect.
The attractiveness of domestic investment increases. In other words: under a minimum
tax, more investors choose domestic investment alternatives than without minimum tax27.
In contrast, a minimum tax does not necessarily favor real investment. Rather, the impact
of varying the minimum tax fraction α is ambiguous, as can be seen from the ﬂuctuating
values of ∆ in the following table:
Table 5: future values of project 1 with initial loss carryforward
L0 = 550,000
future value FLO α = 0 α = 0.25 α = 0.4 α = 0
Tf − T T T 5
FV D
F 2,184,834 2,122,835 2,110,104 2,098,314 2,122,835
FV B
F 2,399,925 1,967,151 1,967,151 1,967,151 1,967,151
FV S
F 2,351,111 2,147,140 2,100,979 2,066,211 1,927,140
FV D
R 2,149,817 2,117,592 2,109,055 2,098,701 2,117,592
FV B
R 2,378,432 1,945,659 1,945,659 1,945,659 1,945,659
FV S
R 2,350,967 2,146,996 2,100,808 2,066,046 1,926,996
∆FV D – 35,017 – 5,244 – 1,049 +387 – 5,244
∆FV – 21,492 – 144 – 1,049 +387 – 5,244
∆ – 21,349 – 20,443 –21,880 – 16,249
Restricting the time limit of a loss carryforward may induce similar investment incentives
as a minimum tax. This is denoted in the right column of table 5. Under a time limit
of, say, Tf = 5 the FV of investment in the foreign branch remains unchanged. Under
the repatriation assumptions, the FV of investment in the foreign subsidiary declines
signiﬁcantly, because the capital gain from liquidating the foreign subsidiary cannot be
oﬀset against the initial loss carryforward that was discarded in the meantime. In the
above example, this eﬀect does not aﬀect domestic investment alternatives. However,
discriminating against the foreign subsidiary induces a relative improvement for domestic
investment28.
Beneﬁcial tax treatment of domestic investment does not necessarily favor real investment
as can be seen from the example L0 = 350,000. In this setting, the diﬀerence of FVs is
27As is discussed below, the introduction of a minimum tax may have the opposite eﬀect – a push-out-
eﬀect – if the investor has no initial loss carryforward (V V0 = 0).
28This eﬀect is also related to the repatriation policy assumed here.
10negative and ∆ is positive which means that real investment is taxed discriminatory









F = 1,990,445 − 2,012,113 = −21,668
∆ = 175
Comparing this result with table 5, it is obvious that the sign of ∆ depends on the
initial loss carryforward. Whereas an initial loss carryforward of L0 = 550,000 induces a
favorable treatment of real investment (∆ = −16,249), real investment is discriminated
against for L0 = 350,000.
The critical thresholds of L0 above which domestic investment is optimal decline after a
time limit on loss carryforwards is introduced. This means that the domestic lock-in eﬀect
is strengthened. Like under the minimum tax, domestic investment becomes advantageous
for a growing number of investors. However, without initial loss carryforward (L0 = 0)
the attractiveness of domestic investment recedes if new losses are possible.
Varying the foreign minimum tax fraction α∗ and the foreign time limit on loss carry-
forwards T ∗
f does not induce any noticeable investment eﬀects in the parameter setting
considered here.
4.2 Rising cash ﬂows
Introducing innovative products often generates starting losses. If the product is suc-
cessful, cash ﬂows rise over time. In contrast to the imitative project discussed above,
innovations are likely to be discriminated against by loss oﬀset limitations. This eﬀect
becomes obvious from project 2 with rising cash ﬂows. The initial outlay is again A0 = 1
million EUR.
Table 6: cash ﬂow of project 2 (in ,000 EUR)
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CFt –200 –100 –50 100 200 300 400 500 600 600
In contrast to the imitative project, this innovative project causes starting losses. In the
pre-tax case, this project is slightly disadvantageous; the pre-tax NPV is –15,899 EUR
(diﬀerence of pre-tax FVs: –41,239 EUR). Now, the present value of linear depreciation
allowances exceeds the present value of economic depreciation. As a result, the diﬀerence
of post-tax NPVs under full loss oﬀset is positive; a classical tax paradox occurs. Table 7
denotes the pre-tax FVs in the diﬀerent cases:
11Table 7: FVs of project 2













∆FV D – 41,239 230,375
∆FV – 41,239 203,285
Assuming varying initial loss carryforwards L0 > 0 und no minimum tax results in the
following FVs and FV diﬀerences:
Table 8: FVs of project 2 with varying values of L0
L0 = 100,000 L0 = 650,000
future value FLO α = 0 FLO α = 0
FV D
F 1,862,482 1,858,427 2,256,468 2,175,168
FV B
F 2,045,837 1,967,151 2,478,611 1,967,151
FV S
F 2,004,226 1,967,140 2,428,196 2,158,925
FV D
R 2,092,856 1,948,624 2,486,843 2,186,102
FV B
R 2,249,122 2,062,351 2,681,896 2,062,351
FV S
R 2,124,998 2,018,695 2,548,969 2,223,369
∆FV D + 230,375 + 90,197 + 230,375 + 10,935
∆FV + 203,285 + 95,200 + 203,285 + 48,201
∆ + 108,085 + 155,084
As indicated by increasing values of ∆, the real investment project is discriminated against
by increasing values of L0 in this parameter setting, even without a minimum tax. The
investment incentives of a minimum tax for an initial loss carryfoward of L0 = 550,000
are given in table 9:
12Table 9: FVs of project 2 under a minimum tax
L0 = 550,000
future value FLO α = 0 α = 0.25 α = 0.4 α = 0; Tf = 5
FV D
F 2,184,834 2,122,835 2,110,104 2,098,314 2,122,835
FV B
F 2,399,925 1,967,151 1,967,151 1,967,151 1,967,151
FV S
F 2,351,111 2,147,140 2,100,979 2,066,211 1,927,140
FV D
R 2,415,209 2,143,702 2,128,723 2,115,254 1,880,371
FV B
R 2,603,210 2,062,351 2,062,351 2,062,351 2,062,351
FV S
R 2,471,883 2,198,695 2,162,200 2,125,499 1,978,695
∆FV D + 230,375 + 20,867 + 18,619 + 16,940 – 242,465
∆FV + 203,285 + 51,555 + 52,096 + 27,185 – 60,484
∆ + 151,730 + 151,189 + 176,100 + 263,769
The non-monotonicity of ∆ with respect to α implies ambiguous investment incentives of
a minimum tax. A minimum tax fraction of α = 0.25 induces a smaller discrimination of
real investment, whereas α = 0.4 causes a greater discrimination compared to unlimited
loss carryforward. If the analysis is restricted to domestic investment alternatives, the
ambiguity also holds.
The lock-in eﬀect from the previous example can be conﬁrmed for project 2, too. The
critical thresholds, above which domestic investment alternatives are optimal, tend to
decline due to the introduction of a minimum tax. For rising cash ﬂows, this eﬀect is less
pronounced than for imitative projects. The following table displays the critical thresholds
L˜
0:
Table 10: critical thresholds of L0 for project 2
critical threshold L˜
0 α = 0 α = 0.25 α = 0.4 Tf = 5
ﬁnancial investment 617,835 531,930 488,832 274,170
real investment 737,893 657,084 575,614 —
In this example, the critical threshold for real investment exceeds the one for ﬁnancial
investment. At ﬁrst sight, introduction of a minimum tax seems reasonable from a ﬁscal
perspective. Loss oﬀset restrictions can induce a domestic lock-in eﬀect and with it
additional tax revenues. However, such a ﬁscal strategy may fail. The example Tf = 5 for
project 2 indicates that under particular parameters, domestic real investment may never
be optimal for an individual investor. In this case, there is no value of the initial loss
carryforward that implies realization of domestic real investment. The discrimination of
real investment is clariﬁed by the right column of table 9. Limiting the loss carryforward
time even leads to a negative diﬀerence of FVs and to a very high ∆-value.
For a minimum tax fraction α = 0.5 there is no critical threshold of L0 either. This
means that the investor will never carry out domestic real investment in this case. These
13examples indicate that restrictive loss oﬀset limitations may impose severe disadvantages,
especially for innovative investment projects.
As in the previous example, varying foreign loss oﬀset parameters induces no important
investment incentives. The critical threshold of L0 for α = 0, Tf = T, T ∗
f = 5 amounts
to L˜
0 = 709,359 EUR compared to L˜
0 = 737,893 EUR for Tf = T. For Tf = T ∗
f = 5
there still exists no critical threshold; domestic real investment is never optimal. A similar
eﬀect can be observed for a foreign minimum tax (α∗ = 0.5). Without domestic minimum
tax, the critical threshold decreases to L˜
0 = 720,500 EUR. Consequently, it is ambiguous
whether a lock-in eﬀect or a push-out eﬀect occurs.
In addition to a domestic initial loss carryforward at time t = 0, a foreign initial loss
carryforward L∗
0 is conceivable. Is this case, the conclusions would be reversed: A foreign
loss carryforward induces a foreign lock-in eﬀect (a push-out eﬀect from domestic per-
spective) that would be intensiﬁed by domestic loss oﬀset restrictions. However, this case
is rather trivial because foreign investment already beneﬁts from lower nominal tax rates
and would be further favored by initial foreign loss carryforwards.
Due to the large number of variables the possible investment eﬀects of loss oﬀset limita-
tions are very complex. Nevertheless, it can be shown that seemingly paradox investment
incentives can be observed in domestic as well as cross-border settings. Whenever an
initial loss carryforward exists, unambiguous results are excluded.
5 Monte Carlo simulations
Due to non-linear functions and state-dependent tax payments, modeling real-world loss
oﬀset rules is quite demanding. Although analytical models would be desirable, even two-
or three-period cases are too complex for economic conclusions. In contrast, numerical
cash ﬂow statements are easily applicable, even in multi-period cases with complex loss
oﬀset rules. To extract representative information from cash ﬂow statements Monte Carlo
simulations with uncertain cash ﬂows are conducted.
5.1 Model design
The structure of cash ﬂows has a signiﬁcant impact on the investment incentives of loss
oﬀset restrictions. Thus, we need the possibility to vary the drift of the cash ﬂow process
using distribution parameters. Starting with a deterministic value CF0, the cash ﬂow
increments εt from period t−1 to period t are assumed to be independent and identically
normally distributed with mean µ und variance σ2:29






, t = 1,...,T (12)
29Cf. Niemann (2003), pp. 23 ﬀ.
14with εt: increment of the cash ﬂow from t − 1 to t
µ: mean of the increment
σ2: variance of the increment.
Choosing the parameter µ < 0 (> 0), it is possible to model cash ﬂows that are expected
to decline (increase) over time. Adjusting the starting value CF0 generates cash ﬂows
with varying expected rates of return. Since each cash ﬂow possesses its own ∆-value,
we will use the arithmetic mean ∆ to evaluate the investment eﬀects. For the following
simulations, the parameters from table 11 are applied.
Table 11: parameters used for the Monte Carlo simulations
pre-tax interest rate: i = 0.1
initial domestic loss carryforward: L0 ∈ {0;...;750,000}
value of loss carryforwards at time t = T: lT = 0
number of simulations for each parameter setting: n = 25,000
domestic income tax rate: τI = 0.4
foreign income tax rate (branch): τB = 0.3
foreign corporate tax rate (subsidiary): τK = 0.2
time horizon: T = 10
domestic time of loss carryforward: Tf ∈ {5; T}
foreign time of loss carryforward: T ∗
f ∈ {5; T}
domestic minimum tax fraction: α ∈ {0; 0.4}
foreign minimum tax fraction: α∗ ∈ {0; 0.5}
standard deviation of εt: σ2 = 50,000
depreciation allowances: linear
Due to the large number of parameters we can expect only conditional statements with
regard to the investment eﬀects of loss oﬀset rules. However, the most important param-
eters seem to be the expected structure of cash ﬂows and the expected rate of return.
Consequently, we will look at marginal and infra-marginal investment with declining and
increasing cash ﬂows.
For the taxational assumptions, we refer to section 3.1. In particular, it is assumed
that there is an exogenous initial loss carryforward L0 ≥ 0 at time t = 0. Again, loss
carryforwards that phase out at time t = T are attached zero value.
The following ﬁgures are intended to clarify the fundamental problem of incomplete loss
oﬀset in a stochastic environment. As is obvious from ﬁgure 1 (left), asymmetric taxation
of proﬁts and losses induces an asymmetric distribution of FVs of real investment. This is
also true if optimal real investment is considered. Figure 2 (right) displays the frequency
distribution of ∆, which is the relative disadvantage of real versus ﬁnancial investment that
is attributable to limited loss oﬀset. From the origin it can be seen that many projects are
15favored a little, whereas a couple of projects are severely penalized. Varying loss oﬀset
parameters induces variations in the frequency distribution and with it in investment
behavior.
Figure 1 Figure 2
frequency distribution of the maximum frequency distribution of ∆
FV of real investment FV max
R
CF0 = 399,018; µ = −50,000;L0 = 500,000; α = 0; Tf = T
5.2 Declining cash ﬂows
Cash ﬂows that are expected to decline over time are associated with investment projects
on mature markets that are not very risky. This pattern can be replicated with negative
values for µ. In the following, we present the results for µ = −50,000 for initial cash
ﬂows of CF0 = 399,018 and CF0 = 624,776. These starting values CF0 correspond to
expected marginal (infra-marginal) investment with expected pre-tax rates of return of
10% and 20%, respectively. The associated results are shown in tables 12-15.
For the parameters CF0 = 399,018 and µ = −50,000, the project is an expected marginal
investment. The contents of tables 12-19 are as follows: Line 1 denotes the starting cash
ﬂow CF0 that corresponds to the expected rate of return. Line 2 consists of the loss
oﬀset parameters. The percentage of advantageous projects with a positive diﬀerence
of pre-tax FVs is denoted in line 3. Values around 50% indicate expected marginal
projects, values around 99% expected infra-marginal projects. If the present value of linear
depreciation allowances exceeds (falls short of) the present value of economic depreciation,
the percentage of advantageous projects increases (declines) compared to the pre-tax case.
Line 4 shows the percentage of advantageous projects after taxes under full loss oﬀset in
the domestic case, line 5 in the international case. For the diﬀerent types of limited loss
oﬀset, the associated percentages of positive diﬀerences of FVs can be seen in lines 6 and
7. Lines 8 and 9 represent the fraction of domestic investment alternatives and domestic
real investment, respectively. Here, it it shown whether domestic or foreign investment is
favored by loss oﬀset rules.
After these percentage values, the mean diﬀerences of FVs in the pre-tax case, in the post-
tax case under full loss oﬀset and in the post-tax case for limited loss oﬀset are printed in
lines 10-14. Lines 11 and 13 contain the domestic values in addition to the international
16values in order to analyze the impact of cross-border investment alternatives. The arith-
metic mean of ∆, which denotes the average relative discrimination of real investment is
given in line 15 for the domestic case and in line 17 for international investment. Since ∆
is distributed highly asymmetrically, the percentage of negative values, i.e., the fraction
of loss oﬀset paradox is given, too.
Table 12: investment eﬀects of initial loss carryforwards
α = 0; Tf = T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 399,018
2 L0 0 250,000 500,000 750,000
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50,02%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 44,72%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 46.08% 46.068% 46.064% 46.064%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 43.78% 44.336% 45.332% 46.568%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 45.716% 47.204% 47.204% 46.636%
8 % domestic investment 0% 60%
9 % domestic real investment 0% 6.636%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic –94,561
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO –69,265 –71,564 –73,578 –75,338
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic –233,474 –212,921 –193,502 –187,151
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO –146,925 –147,643 –150,338 –147,616
15 ∅ ∆domestic 138,913 118,360 98,941 92,590
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0% 47.52% 54.864% 61.116%
17 ∅ ∆ 77,660 76,079 76,759 72,278
18 % with ∆ < 0 0% 43.536% 38.976% 40.584%
The investment eﬀects of varying the initial loss carryforward L0 are summarized in table
12. Since the present value of linear depreciation allowances falls short of the average
present value of economic depreciation, the arithmetic mean of the diﬀerence of FVs
is negative (lines 11-14), and the percentage of advantageous real investment decreases
compared to the pre-tax case (lines 3-7).
As already stated in the deterministic examples, an initial loss carryforward exhibits
severe implications on the relative advantage of diﬀerent investment alternatives. In
this case, no special loss oﬀset limitations exist, that means there is no minimum tax
or time limit on loss carryforwards. Thus, loss carryforwards are unlimited. As could
be expected, an initial loss carryforward favors domestic investment. Whereas no single
domestic investment project is chosen for initial loss carryforwards of up to L0 ≤ 500,000,
domestic investment predominates for L0 = 750,000. However, of the 60% domestic
investment alternatives, only 6.636% are domestic real investment (lines 8 and 9).
Assuming cash ﬂows that are expected to decrease over time, real investment is favored
by increasing initial loss carryforwards. This eﬀect can be recognized from the increased
17fraction of advantageous projects (lines 4 and 6 / 5 and 7) and from the lower arithmetic
means of ∆ (lines 15 and 17). In the domestic case, the percentage of loss oﬀset paradox
increases with L0 whereas the eﬀect is ambiguous in the international case. The reason
is that the loss oﬀset eﬀect interferes with a diﬀerent choice of investment alternatives.
∆ exaggerates the discrimination of real investment due to the zero valuation of remaining
loss carryforwards at time t = T. Valuing vanishing loss carryforwards with a positive
constant would reduce the arithmetic mean of ∆ and increase the percentage of loss oﬀset
paradox. However, such a valuation seems arbitrary.
The eﬀects of a domestic minimum tax on real investment with expected decreasing cash
ﬂows can be seen from table 13:
Table 13: investment incentives of a domestic minimum tax
L0 = 500,000; Tf = T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 399,018
2 α 0 0,4
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50.02%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 44.72%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 46.064%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 45.332% 45.688%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 47.204% 46.816%
8 % with domestic investment 0% 53.312%
9 % with domestic real investment 0% 0.128%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic –94,561
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO –73,578
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic –193,502 –206,933
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO –150,338 –138,901
15 ∅ ∆domestic 98,941 112,372
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 54.864% 55.664%
17 ∅ ∆ 76,759 65,323
18 % with ∆ < 0 38.976% 60.644%
As can be seen from line 8, the minimum tax induces a domestic lock-in eﬀect that holds
almost exclusively for ﬁnancial investment. Domestic real investment is carried out rarely
(0,128% of all investment alternatives, see line 9). Analyzing the intrastate and cross-
border models reveals similar eﬀects: The domestic minimum tax discriminates against
real investment compared to neutral taxation. Compared to the case without minimum
tax, the eﬀects are contrary: The domestic minimum tax favors (discriminates against)
real investment in the international (intrastate) case (lines 13 and 14). As a reﬂection,
∆ is positive and decreases (rises) (lines 15 and 17). Loss oﬀset paradox occur more
frequently than without minimum tax in both cases (lines 16 and 18). The distribution
of ∆ becomes more skewed due to the minimum tax.
18Limiting the time of loss carryforwards induces the investment eﬀects denoted in table
14:
Table 14: investment incentives from a time limit on loss carryforwards
L0 = 500,000; α = 0; Tf = T
1 CF0 399,018
2 Tf T 5
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50.020%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 44.720%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 46.064%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 45.332%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 47.204% 45.332%
8 % with domestic investment 0% 82.372%
9 % with domestic real investment 0% 27.704%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic –94,561
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO –73,578
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic –193,502 –193,774
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO –150,338 –179,473
15 ∅ ∆domestic 98,941 99,214
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 54.864% 54.78%
17 ∅ ∆ 76,759 105,895
18 % with ∆ < 0 38.976% 17.7%
The domestic lock-in eﬀect is even more pronounced than for a minimum tax. Now, a
signiﬁcant percentage of domestic real investment is carried out. Neglecting cross-country
diﬀerences, real investment is discriminated against. The diﬀerence of FVs decreases in
the intrastate as well as in the cross-border case and ∆ increases whereas the number of
loss oﬀset paradox declines.
Varying foreign loss oﬀset parameters is almost ineﬀective. This is true for a foreign min-
imum tax as well as a time limit on foreign loss carryforwards. Therefore, the associated
values are left aside.
Dropping the assumption of expected marginal investment and assuming an expected
pre-tax rate of return of 20% – this corresponds to a starting value of CF0 = 624.776 –
enhances the relative importance of the nominal tax rate compared to loss oﬀset rules.
The choice of location mainly follows the nominal tax rate. As a consequence, no single
domestic real investment project out of 25,000 cases is carried out, neither with nor with-
out minimum tax. A lock-in eﬀect does not exist for expected infra-marginal investment
projects, as can be seen from table 15:
19Table 15: investment incentives of a domestic minimum tax
Tf = T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 624,776
2 α 0 0 0,4 0,4
L0 0 500,000 0 500,000
3 % with ∆FV > 0 99.464%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 98.968%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 99.156% 99.152% 99.156% 99.152%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 98.608% 98.824% 98.608% 98.864%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 99.096% 99.168% 99.096% 99.16%
8 % domestic investment 0% 0,84%
9 % domestic real investment 0%
10 ∅ ∆FV 3,596,601
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic 1,690,838
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO 2,097,433 2,097,327
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic 1,687,139 1,719,695 1,687,139 1,733,926
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO 2,096,438 2,037,187 2,096,438 2,088,674
15 ∅ ∆domestic 3,699 –28,857 3,699 –43,088
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0% 97.932% 0% 98.376%
17 ∅ ∆ 995 60,139 995 8,652
18 % with ∆ < 0 0% 9.628% 0% 43.652%
Introducing an initial loss carryforward substantially changes the optimal investment al-
ternatives. Without initial loss carryforward, the foreign branch is the optimal alterna-
tive, with a suﬃciently large initial loss carryforward, it is the foreign subsidiary. For
L0 = 500,000; α = 0, real investment is carried out in the foreign subsidiary in 24,434
cases (foreign branch: 358 cases), for L0 = 0, only in 442 cases (foreign branch: 24,332
cases). The reason is that investment in a foreign subsidiary enables to use domestic loss
carryforwards – at least to a limited degree. Although this advantage declines after the
introduction of a minimum tax, the foreign subsidiary remains the optimal alternative in
this case. Introducing a minimum tax reduces the arithmetic mean of ∆ which means
that discrimination of real investment compared to ﬁnancial investment is reduced. In the
parameter setting considered here, the minimum tax induces only secondary investment
incentives. This is also true for a time limit on loss carryforwards.
5.3 Increasing cash ﬂows
Cash ﬂows that expectedly increase over time will be modeled by µ = +100,000. Expected
marginal investment is associated with a starting value CF0 = −309,801, infra-marginal
investment with an expected rate of return of 20% with a starting value CF0 = −84,043.
On average, the present value of linear depreciation allowances exceeds the present value
of economic depreciation. Thus, under taxation with full loss oﬀset, the percentage of
20projects with a positive diﬀerence of FVs increases compared to the pre-tax case (lines
3-5).
For expected marginal projects, a domestic lock-in eﬀect can be observed only for rela-
tively large values of the initial loss carryforward. If such a lock-in eﬀect occurs, it applies
almost exclusively for ﬁnancial investment. For L0 = 750,000, domestic real investment
is the optimal alternative in less than 1% of cases (line 9 of table 16). Typically, the
optimal alternative is the foreign subsidiary.
An increasing initial loss oﬀset tends to discriminate against real investment, even in the
absence of special loss oﬀset restrictions (line 17 of table 16). The mean diﬀerence of FVs
becomes negative in the intrastate as well as in the cross-border setting. A loss oﬀset
paradox can be observed in no single out of 25,000 cases.
Table 16: investment eﬀects of initial loss carryforwards
α = 0; Tf = T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 –309,801
2 L0 0 250,000 500,000 750,000
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50.02%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 63.984%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 60.692%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 57.232% 54.62% 52.744% 51.432%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 55.54% 53.82% 53.82% 51.432%
8 % domestic investment 0% 49.5%
9 % domestic real investment 0% 0.932%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic 257,224
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO 246,987 244,369 242,187 240,408
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic 82,557 17,061 –37,184 –84,771
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO 80,159 35,957 –5,657 –37,293
15 ∅ ∆domestic 174,667 240,163 294,408 341,995
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0%
17 ∅ ∆ 166,828 208,411 247,844 277,701
18 % with ∆ < 0 0%
As can be seen in table 17, a domestic minimum tax causes a domestic lock-in eﬀect which
exclusively applies to ﬁnancial investment. In no single case out of 25,000, domestic
real investment is the optimal investment alternative for L0 = 500,000 and α = 0.4.
Comparing lines 13 and 14 reveals that the investment eﬀects of introducing a minimum
tax can diﬀer from an intrastate and a cross-border perspective. In an intrastate setting, a
domestic minimum tax increases (line 13), in an international setting, a domestic minimum
tax surprisingly reduces the discrimination of real investment (line 14). All in all, a
signiﬁcant relative disadvantage for real investment remains (∆ > 0, lines 15 and 17).
21Table 17: investment incentives of a domestic minimum tax
L0 = 500,000; Tf = T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 –309,801
2 α 0 0,4
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50.02%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 63.984%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 60.692%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 52.744% 52.312%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 53.82% 53.44%
8 % domestic investment 0% 46.56%
9 % domestic real investment 0%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic 257,224
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO 242,187
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic –37,184 –97,811
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO –5,657 14,476
15 ∅ ∆domestic 294,408 355,035
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0%
17 ∅ ∆ 247,844 227,711
18 % with ∆ < 0 0%
A time limit on loss carryforwards overwhelmingly discriminates real investment. For
L0 = 500,000, the mean diﬀerence of FVs is negative (table 18, lines 13 and 14), and
the ∆-values increase substantially. The domestic lock-in eﬀect only applies to ﬁnancial
investment (lines 8 and 9).
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L0 = 500,000; α = 0; T ∗
f = T
1 CF0 –309,801
2 Tf T 5
3 % with ∆FV > 0 50.02%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 63.984%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 60.692%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 52.744% 41.548%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 53.82% 49.888%
8 % domestic investment 0% 50.112%
9 % domestic real investment 0%
10 ∅ ∆FV –1,393
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic 257,224
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO 242,187
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic –37,184 –235,092
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO –5,657 –48,760
15 ∅ ∆domestic 294,408 492,316
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0%
17 ∅ ∆ 247,844 290,947
18 % with ∆ < 0 0%
Restricting foreign loss oﬀset parameters slightly increases the domestic lock-in eﬀect
that occurs for L0 = 500,000 und α = 0.4. Since only foreign investment is discriminated
against in this setting, the attractiveness of real investment that is exclusively realized
in the foreign country, is reduced, too. For T ∗
f = 5, the mean diﬀerence of FVs becomes
negative. A foreign minimum tax (α∗ = 0.5) does not induce a domestic lock-in eﬀect
and does not cause noticeable investment eﬀects.
For expected infra-marginal projects (CF0 = −84,043) with increasing cash ﬂows, an
initial loss carryforward typically discriminates against real investment (table 19, lines 14
and 17), because loss carryforwards can be oﬀset against proﬁts later than for ﬁnancial
investment.
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1 CF0 –84,043
2 L0 0 500,000 500,000 500,000
α 0 0 0 0,4
Tf T T 5 T
T ∗
f T T T T
3 % with ∆FV > 0 99.464%
4 % with ∆FV FLO
domestic > 0 99.76%
5 % with ∆FV FLO > 0 99.696%
6 % with ∆FV LLO
domestic > 0 99.668% 99.556% 99.112% 99.556%
7 % with ∆FV LLO > 0 99.628% 99.576% 99.444% 99.564%
8 % domestic investment 0% 0.56% 0.436%
9 % domestic real investment 0% 0.004% 0%
10 ∅ ∆FV 3,596,601
11 ∅ ∆FV FLO
domestic 2,042,622
12 ∅ ∆FV FLO 2,417,231 2,417,223
13 ∅ ∆FV LLO
domestic 2,033,091 2,005,945 1,988,247 2,015,305
14 ∅ ∆FV LLO 2,408,333 2,261,634 2,279,414 2,313,493
15 ∅ ∆domestic 9,531 36,677 54,376 27,318
16 % with ∆domestic < 0 0% 2.292% 13.924%
17 ∅ ∆ 8,898 155,589 137,809 103,730
18 % with ∆ < 0 0%
Introducing a minimum tax can reduce the discrimination of real investment in the in-
trastate as well as in the cross-border setting. This eﬀect can be seen from the reduced
values of ∆, which are still positive. A signiﬁcant domestic lock-in eﬀect does not occur,
neither for the minimum tax nor for a time limit on loss carryforwards. The latter restric-
tion provokes almost no eﬀects for L0 = 0 and induces a slightly reduced discrimination
of real investment for L0 = 500,000. A loss oﬀset paradox could not be observed for these
parameters. Even in an intrastate setting, seemingly paradox eﬀects are rare. Again,
restrictions on foreign loss oﬀset parameters do not induce noticeable investment eﬀects.
5.4 Results
The Monte Carlo simulations conﬁrm the results from the deterministic examples. A
summarizing overview of the investment incentives reveals the following:
• Varying a single loss oﬀset parameter typically induces ambiguous eﬀects. Invest-
ment incentives are almost always combinations of all parameters under considera-
tion.
• The results are especially sensitive with respect to the initial loss carryforward.
• On average, ﬁnancial investment is favored over real investment for all structures
of cash ﬂows and all versions of incomplete loss oﬀset. However, it is easy to ﬁnd
single counter-examples.
24• Investment projects with decreasing cash ﬂows are less likely to be discriminated
against than projects with increasing cash ﬂows.
• Expected infra-marginal projects are less likely to be discriminated against than
expected marginal projects.
• A domestic minimum tax tends to reduce the discrimination of real investment
slightly.
• A time limit on domestic loss carryforwards intensiﬁes the discrimination of real
investment.
• A loss oﬀset paradox occurs less frequently in an international setting than in an
intrastate setting. From an intrastate perspective, negative values for ∆ could
be observed mainly for expected marginal projects with decreasing cash ﬂows. In
contrast to the intrastate case, the arithmetic mean of ∆ was always positive in the
cross-border setting.
• An initial domestic loss carryforward generates a domestic lock-in eﬀect.
• Domestic loss oﬀset limitations may intensify the domestic lock-in eﬀect. Depending
on the parameter setting, the opposite – a push-out eﬀect – may occur as well.
• Foreign loss oﬀset limitations were largely ineﬀective.
6 Summary and conclusion
This paper analyzes the investment incentives of loss oﬀset restrictions for investors with
cross-border activities. Since both real and ﬁnancial investment can be carried out domes-
tically as well as abroad, it is necessary to determine the optimal way for both alternatives.
To put a limit on the variety of possible legal structures, the analysis is restricted to the
alternatives “domestic business”, “foreign branch”, and “foreign subsidiary”. The opti-
mization process is simpliﬁed by the assumption of irreversible investment which implies
that only terminal repatriation is possible. The alternatives with the maximum FV have
to be computed. By comparing both optimal alternatives, it can be decided whether
or not to invest and which alternative to choose. Thus, investment eﬀects of loss oﬀset
restrictions have to be identiﬁed by the relative impact on real versus ﬁnancial investment.
A prominent loss oﬀset parameter is an initial domestic loss carryforward. Integrating a
loss carryforward at the time of investment creates a decision situation neglected by the
literature until now. The other parameters under consideration are a minimum tax on
positive proﬁts regardless of existing loss carryforwards and a time limit on loss carryfor-
wards. It is necessary to distinguish between diﬀerent cash ﬂow structures and diﬀerent
rates of return, because investment incentives are ambiguous.
A suﬃciently high initial loss carryforward creates a domestic lock-in eﬀect. This eﬀect
is highly relevant for ﬁnancial investment, but occurs rarely for real investment. The
25lock-in eﬀect may be strengthened by domestic loss oﬀset restrictions, but the opposite is
possible, too.
Whereas the incentives of a minimum tax are ambiguous – it may favor as well as discrim-
inate against real investment – a time limit on loss carryforwards mostly discriminates
against real investment projects. Foreign loss oﬀset restrictions are largely irrelevant for
investment decisions.
The example of loss oﬀset rules clariﬁes the necessity of international tax planning for
investors as well as ﬁscal authorities. As could be shown, even small variations of loss oﬀset
parameters may be suﬃcient to turn a lock-in eﬀect into a push-out eﬀect. Therefore, it
is sensible from a ﬁscal perspective to anticipate the tax revenue eﬀects of particular tax
law settings by using investor-oriented models. At the moment, there is no evidence that
this actually happens.
Tax planning of cross-border investment further oﬀers insights into taxational choices.
Although the choice of location is no taxational choice in the ﬁrst place, it oﬀers the
investor the possibility to inﬂuence his own tax burden. Hence, it is an actual taxational
choice. As long as taxational choices exist, tax neutrality is impossible from an intrastate
as well as a cross-border perspective. This is an unsolved problem, not only for public
economists who are in favor of tax neutrality, but also for tax planners who need a yard-
stick for measuring tax eﬀects. In our analysis, complete loss oﬀset was the appropriate
yardstick for an isolated analysis of loss oﬀset limitations. Tax neutrality is deﬁned only
for the tax base as a whole, not for particular tax base elements. Since diﬀerent tax
base elements may induce oﬀsetting investment incentives, normative statements on the
desirability of particular loss oﬀset limitations are impossible from the perspective of tax
neutrality.
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